

GIANFORCARO LAW
GREGORY G. GIANFORCARO, ESQ.
NJ ID No. 024551988
80 South Main Street
Phillipsburg, New Jersey 08865
Telephone: (908) 859-2200
Facsimile: (908) 859-3441
gianforcarolaw@msn.com

JEFF ANDERSON & ASSOCIATES PA
JEFFREY R. ANDERSON, ESQ.
TRUSHA P. GOFFE, ESQ.
NJ ID No. 311052019
NJ ID No. 305772019
505 Thornall Street, Suite 405
Edison, NJ 08837
Telephone: (909) 344-3847
Facsimile: (651) 297-6543
jeff@andersonadvocates.com
trusha@andersonadvocates.com

Attorneys for Plaintiff

JA/GG DOE 1, representing one (1)
plaintiff,

Plaintiff,

v.

**THE DIOCESE OF CAMDEN, NEW
JERSEY A/K/A DIOCESE OF
CAMDEN; ST. PETER’S; ST.
GIANNA BERETTA MOLLA
PARISH A/K/A ST. GIANNA
BERETTA MOLLA PARISH
ROMAN CATHOLIC CHURCH
A/K/A ST. GIANNA PARISH A/K/A
ST. GIANNA; BROTHERS OF
CHARITY AMERICA DISTRICT –
REGION OF OUR LADY OF
CHARITY A/K/A BROTHERS OF
CHARITY REGION OF OUR LADY
OF CHARITY A/K/A BROTHERS
OF CHARITY; ABC ENTITY**, its
priests, reverends, teachers, deacons,
directors, officers, employees, agents,
servants, representatives and/or
volunteers, is a fictitious name of an
entity believed to have employed Br.
Walter Hicks; and **JOHN DOES 1-5**,
individually, and in their capacity as a
former and/or current priest, reverend,
teacher, deacon, director, officer,
employee, agent, servant, representative
and/or volunteer of the defendants, are
persons whose identities are unknown to
Plaintiff,

Defendants.

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
LAW DIVISION - CAMDEN COUNTY

DOCKET NO.: _____

CIVIL ACTION

COMPLAINT, JURY DEMAND AND
DESIGNATION OF TRIAL COUNSEL

Plaintiff, JA/GG DOE 1, by and through Plaintiff's attorneys, by way of Complaint against the Defendants, states and alleges as follows:

PARTIES

1. At all times material to this Complaint, Plaintiff resided in the State of New Jersey. Plaintiff is proceeding under a pseudonym pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2A:61B-1(f).

2. At all times material, Defendant The Diocese of Camden, New Jersey a/k/a Diocese of Camden (hereinafter "Diocese of Camden") was and continues to be an organization or entity which includes, but is not limited to, civil corporations, decision making entities, officials, and representatives/agents/employees, authorized to conduct business and conducting business in the State of New Jersey with its principal place of business at 631 Market Street, Camden, NJ. The Diocese of Camden was established in approximately 1937. Later the Diocese created a corporation called The Diocese of Camden, New Jersey, to conduct some of its affairs. The Diocese of Camden operates its affairs as both a corporate entity and as an organization named the Diocese of Camden, with the Bishop as the top official. Both of these entities and all other corporations and entities controlled by the Bishop are included in this Complaint as being the Diocese of Camden. The Archbishop is the top official of the Diocese of Camden and is given authority over all matters within the Diocese of Camden as a result of his position. The Diocese of Camden functions as a business by engaging in numerous revenue producing activities and soliciting money from its members in exchange for its services. The Diocese of Camden has several programs which seek out the participation of children in the Diocese of Camden's activities. The Diocese of Camden, through its officials, has control over those activities involving children. The Diocese of Camden has the power to appoint, supervise, monitor and terminate each

person working with children within the Diocese of Camden.

3. The Diocese of Camden is a resident of the State of New Jersey because its principal place of business is in the state.

4. At all times material, Defendant St. Peter's ("St. Peter's") was an organization authorized to conduct business in the State of New Jersey, with its principal place of business at 25 West Verona Avenue, Pleasantville, NJ 08232. St. Peter's includes, but is not limited to, the St. Peter's corporation and any other organizations and/or entities operating under the same or similar name with the same or similar principal place of business.

5. At all times material, St. Peter's was under the direct authority, control, and province of Defendant Diocese and the Bishop of the Diocese of Camden. Defendant St. Peter's includes any school affiliated with St. Peter's. At all times material, the parish was under the direct authority, control, and province of Defendant St. Peter's and the Bishop of the Diocese of Camden. At all times material, Defendants St. Peter's and Diocese owned, operated, managed, maintained, and controlled St. Peter's.

6. At all times material, St. Gianna Beretta Molla Parish, ("St. Gianna") was and continues to be an organization authorized to conduct business and conducting business in the State of New Jersey, with its principal place of business at 1421 New Road, Northfield, NJ 08225-1103. Upon information and belief, St. Peter's was absorbed into St. Gianna in a de facto merger or series of de facto mergers. Upon information and belief St. Gianna continued the missions and ministry of St. Peter's, and remained under the direct authority, control and province of the Diocese of Camden and the Bishop of the Diocese of Camden after the merger(s). Upon information and belief St. Peter's ceased ordinary business operations as soon as possible after the transaction(s), and St. Gianna assumed St. Peter's liabilities ordinarily necessary for the uninterrupted

continuation of St. Peter's operations and business with a continuity of management, personnel, physical location and general business operation. St. Gianna includes, but is not limited to, the parish corporation and any other organizations and/or entities operating under the same or similar name with the same or similar principal place of business.

7. At all times material, St. Gianna was under the direct authority, control, and province of Defendant Diocese and the Bishop of the Diocese of Camden. Defendant St. Gianna includes any school affiliated with St. Gianna. At all times material, the parish was under the direct authority, control, and province of Defendant St. Gianna and the Bishop of the Diocese of Camden. At all times material, Defendants St. Gianna and Diocese owned, operated, managed, maintained, and controlled the St. Gianna.

8. For purposes of this Complaint, Defendants St. Peter's and St. Gianna are referred to collectively as "Parish."

9. At all times material, Defendant Brothers of Charity American District – Region of Our Lady of Charity a/k/a Brothers of Charity Region of Our Lady of Charity a/k/a Brothers of Charity (hereinafter "Brothers of Charity") was and continues to be a religious order of priests and brothers affiliated with the Roman Catholic Church with its headquarters at 7720 Doe Lane, Glenside, PA 19038.

10. At all times material, Brothers of Charity was and continues to be an organization or entity that includes, but is not limited to, civil corporation, decision making entities, officials, and employees and/or agents, and at all times material was authorized to conduct business and conducted business in the State of New Jersey and the Diocese of Camden. The Superior General is the top official of Brothers of Charity and is given authority over all matters dealing with Brothers of Charity as a result of his position. Brothers of Charity function as a business by

engaging in numerous revenue-producing activities and soliciting money from its members in exchange for its services.

11. Brothers of Charity have several programs that seek out the participation of children, including but not limited to schools and other educational programs. Brothers of Charity, through its officials, have complete control over those activities and programs involving children. Brothers of Charity have the power to appoint, train, supervise, monitor, remove and terminate each and every person working with children within Brothers of Charity.

12. The Diocese of Camden, St. Peter's, St. Gianna, and Brothers of Charity are collectively referred to as "Defendants" herein.

13. Whenever reference is made to any Defendant entity, such reference includes that entity, its parent companies, subsidiaries, affiliates, predecessors, and successors. In addition, whenever reference is made to any act, deed, or transaction of any entity, the allegation means that the entity engaged in the act, deed, or transaction by or through its officers, directors, agents, employees, or representatives while they were actively engaged in the management, direction, control, or transaction of the entity's business or affairs.

14. The Defendant ABC ENTITY, its priests, reverends, teachers, deacons, directors, officers, employees, agents, servants, representatives and/or volunteers, is a fictitious name of an entity believed to have employed Brother Walter Hicks, F.C.

15. The Defendant JOHN DOES 1-5, individually, and in their capacity as a former and/or current priest, reverend, teacher, deacon, director, officer, employee, agent, servant, representative and/or volunteer of the defendants, are persons whose identities are unknown to Plaintiff.

JURISDICTION, VENUE AND NEW LAWS

16. This Court has jurisdiction over this action as Defendants Diocese of Camden's and Parish's principal places of business are in New Jersey and because the unlawful conduct complained of herein occurred in New Jersey.

17. Venue is proper in this county pursuant to New Jersey Court Rule 4:3-2 because this County is the principal place of business of Defendant Diocese of Camden. In addition, events that are relevant to this action occurred within this County.

18. Recently, New Jersey passed into law Bills S477 and A3648, which became effective December 1, 2019. These new laws extend the statute of limitations in civil actions for sexual abuse claims, as well as created a two (2) year window for parties to bring previously time-barred actions based on sexual abuse. The new laws also expand the categories of potential defendants in civil actions and permit retroactive application of standards of liability to past acts of abuse for which liability did not previously exist. The said new laws apply to the parties herein.

FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS

19. At all times material, Brother Walter Hicks, F.C. ("Br. Hicks") was a Roman Catholic cleric employed by the Diocese of Camden, Parish, and Brothers of Charity. Br. Hicks remained under the direct supervision, employ, and control of Defendants.

20. Defendants placed Br. Hicks in positions where Br. Hicks had access to and worked with children as an integral part of his work.

21. Plaintiff was raised in a devout Roman Catholic family and attended St. Peter's in Pleasantville, New Jersey, in the Diocese of Camden. Plaintiff and Plaintiff's family came in contact with Br. Hicks as an agent and representative of Defendants, and at St. Peter's.

22. Plaintiff participated in youth activities and/or church activities at St. Peter's. Plaintiff, therefore, developed great admiration, trust, reverence, and respect for the Roman Catholic Church, including Defendants and their agents, including Br. Hicks.

23. During and through these activities, Plaintiff, as a minor and vulnerable child, was dependent on Defendants and Br. Hicks. Defendants had custody and/or supervision of Plaintiff and accepted the entrustment of Plaintiff and, therefore, had responsibility for Plaintiff and authority over Plaintiff.

24. From approximately 1978 to 1980, when Plaintiff was approximately 7 to 9 years old, Br. Hicks engaged in unpermitted sexual contact with Plaintiff.

25. Plaintiff's relationship to Defendants and Br. Hicks, as a vulnerable child, parishioner, student and participant in church activities, was one in which Plaintiff was subject to the ongoing influence of Defendants and Br. Hicks.

26. The culture of the Catholic Church over Plaintiff created pressure on Plaintiff not to report the abuse Plaintiff suffered.

27. Defendants knew or should have known that Br. Hicks was a danger to children before Br. Hicks sexually assaulted Plaintiff.

28. Prior to the sexual abuse of Plaintiff, Defendants learned or should have learned that Br. Hicks was not fit to work with children. Defendants, by and through their agents, servants and/or employees, became aware, or should have become aware of Br. Hicks's propensity to commit sexual abuse and of the risk to Plaintiff's safety. At the very least, Defendants knew or should have known that they did not have sufficient information about whether or not their leaders and people working at Catholic institutions within the Diocese were safe.

29. Defendants knew or should have known that there was a risk of child sex abuse for

children participating in Catholic programs and activities within the Diocese. At the very least, Defendants knew or should have known that they did not have sufficient information about whether or not there was a risk of child sex abuse for children participating in Catholic programs and activities within the Diocese.

30. Defendants knew or should have known that Defendants had numerous agents who had sexually molested children. Defendants knew or should have known that child molesters have a high rate of recidivism. Defendants knew or should have known that some of the leaders and people working in Catholic institutions within the Diocese were not safe and that there was a specific danger of child sex abuse for children participating in their youth programs.

31. Instead, Defendants negligently deemed that Br. Hicks was fit to work with children and/or that any previous problems were fixed or cured and/or that Br. Hicks would not sexually assault children and/or that Br. Hicks would not injure children.

32. Defendants owed Plaintiff a duty of reasonable care because they had superior knowledge about the risk that Br. Hicks posed to Plaintiff, the risk of abuse in general in their programs and/or the risks that their facilities posed to minor children.

33. Defendants owed a duty to Plaintiff to protect Plaintiff from harm because Defendants' actions created a foreseeable risk of harm to Plaintiff. As a vulnerable child participating in the programs and activities Defendants offered to minors, Plaintiff was a foreseeable victim. As a vulnerable child who Br. Hicks had access to through Defendants' facilities and programs, Plaintiff was a foreseeable victim.

34. Defendants also breached their duty to Plaintiff by actively maintaining and employing Br. Hicks in a position of power and authority through which Br. Hicks had access to children, including Plaintiff, and power and control over children, including Plaintiff.

35. Each Defendant breached its duties to Plaintiff. Defendants failed to use ordinary care in determining whether their facilities were safe and/or determining whether they had sufficient information to represent their facilities as safe. Defendants' breach of their duties include, but are not limited to: failure to protect Plaintiff from a known danger, failure to have sufficient policies and procedures to prevent child sex abuse, failure to properly implement policies and procedures to prevent child sex abuse, failure to take reasonable measures to make sure that policies and procedures to prevent child sex abuse were working, failure to adequately inform families and children of the risks of child sex abuse, failure to investigate risks of child sex abuse, failure to properly train the employees at institutions and programs within Defendants' geographical confines, failure to train parishioners within Defendants' geographical confines about the risk of sexual abuse, failure to have any outside agency test their safety procedures, failure to protect the children in their programs from child sex abuse, failure to adhere to the applicable standard of care for child safety, failure to investigate the amount and type of information necessary to represent the institutions, programs, leaders and people as safe, failure to train their employees properly to identify signs of child sexual abuse by fellow employees, failure by relying upon mental health professionals, and/or failure by relying on people who claimed that they could treat child molesters.

36. Defendants also breached their duty to Plaintiff by failing to warn Plaintiff and Plaintiff's family of the risk that Br. Hicks posed and the risks of child sexual abuse in Catholic institutions. They also failed to warn them about any of the knowledge that Defendants had about child sexual abuse.

37. Defendants additionally violated a legal duty by failing to report known and/or suspected abuse of children by Br. Hicks and/or its other agents to the child protection agencies,

police and law enforcement.

38. Defendants were negligent and/or made representations to Plaintiff and Plaintiff's family during each and every year of Plaintiff's minority.

39. As a result of Defendants' negligence as described herein, Plaintiff has suffered, and will continue to suffer, great pain of mind and body, severe and permanent emotional distress, physical manifestations of emotional distress, embarrassment, loss of self-esteem, humiliation, physical, personal and psychological injuries. Plaintiff was prevented, and will continue to be prevented, from performing normal daily activities and obtaining the full enjoyment of life; and/or has incurred and will continue to incur expenses for psychological treatment, therapy, and counseling, and, on information and belief has and/or will incur loss of income and/or loss of earning capacity.

COUNT I: NEGLIGENCE

Plaintiff incorporates all consistent paragraphs of this Complaint as if fully set forth under this count.

40. Each Defendant owed Plaintiff a duty of reasonable care to protect the Plaintiff from injury.

41. Each Defendant owed Plaintiff a duty of care because each Defendant had a special relationship with Plaintiff.

42. Defendants also had a duty arising from the special relationship that existed with Plaintiff, Plaintiff's parents, and other parents of young, innocent, vulnerable children, to properly train and supervise their clerics. This special relationship arose because of the high degree of vulnerability of the children entrusted to their care. As a result of this high degree of vulnerability and risk of sexual abuse inherent in such a special relationship, Defendants had a duty to establish

measures of protection not necessary for persons who are older and better able to safeguard themselves.

43. Each Defendant owed Plaintiff a duty to protect Plaintiff from harm because each Defendant also had a special relationship with Br. Hicks.

44. Defendants owed Plaintiff a duty of reasonable care because they solicited youth and parents for participation in their youth programs; encouraged youth and parents to have the youth participate in their programs; undertook custody of minor children, including Plaintiff; promoted their facilities and programs as being safe for children; held their agents, including Br. Hicks, out as safe to work with children; encouraged parents and children to spend time with their agents; and/or encouraged their agents, including Br. Hicks, to spend time with, interact with, and recruit children.

45. By holding Br. Hicks out as safe to work with children, and by undertaking the custody, supervision of, and/or care of the minor Plaintiff, each Defendant entered into a fiduciary relationship with the minor Plaintiff. As a result of Plaintiff being a minor, and by Defendants undertaking the care and guidance of the then vulnerable minor Plaintiff, each Defendant held a position of empowerment over Plaintiff.

46. Further, Defendants, by holding themselves out as being able to provide a safe environment for children, solicited and/or accepted this position of empowerment. Defendants thus entered into a fiduciary relationship with Plaintiff. Defendants exploited their position of empowerment, putting Plaintiff at risk to be sexually assaulted.

47. By accepting custody and/or supervision of the minor Plaintiff, Defendants established an *in loco parentis* relationship with Plaintiff and in so doing, owed Plaintiff a duty to protect Plaintiff from injury. Further, Defendants entered into a fiduciary relationship with Plaintiff

by undertaking the custody, supervision of, and/or care of the minor Plaintiff. As a result of Plaintiff being a minor, and by Defendants undertaking the care and guidance of the Plaintiff, Defendants also held a position of empowerment over Plaintiff. Further, Defendants, by holding themselves out as being able to provide a safe environment for children, solicited and/or accepted this position of empowerment. Defendants, through its employees, exploited this power over Plaintiff and thereby put the minor Plaintiff at risk for sexual abuse.

48. By establishing and/or operating the Diocese of Camden, Parish, and Brothers of Charity, accepting the minor Plaintiff as a participant in their programs, holding their facilities and programs out to be a safe environment for Plaintiff, accepting custody of the minor Plaintiff *in loco parentis*, and by establishing a fiduciary relationship with Plaintiff, Defendants entered into an express and/or implied duty to properly supervise Plaintiff and provide a reasonably safe environment for children, who participated in their programs. Defendants owed Plaintiff a duty to properly supervise Plaintiff to prevent harm from foreseeable dangers. Defendants had the duty to exercise the same degree of care over minors under their control as a reasonably prudent person would have exercised under similar circumstances.

49. By establishing and operating the Diocese of Camden, Parish, and Brothers of Charity, which offered educational programs to children and which may have included a school, and by accepting the enrollment and participation of the minor Plaintiff as a participant in those educational programs, Defendants owed Plaintiff a duty to properly supervise Plaintiff to prevent harm from generally foreseeable dangers.

50. Each Defendant owed Plaintiff a duty to protect Plaintiff from harm because Defendants invited Plaintiff onto their property and Br. Hicks posed a dangerous condition on Defendants' property.

51. Each Defendant breached its duties to Plaintiff by failing to use reasonable care. Each Defendant's failures include, but are not limited to, failing to properly supervise Br. Hicks, failing to properly supervise Plaintiff and failing to protect Plaintiff from a known danger.

52. As a direct result of the foregoing, Plaintiff sustained physical, emotional, and psychological injuries, along with pain and suffering.

WHEREFORE, Plaintiff demands judgment against Defendants, jointly and/or severally, for compensatory damages, together with interest and costs in an unspecified amount, plus costs, disbursements, reasonable attorneys' fees, interest, and such other and further relief as the court deems just and equitable.

COUNT II: NEGLIGENT TRAINING AND SUPERVISION

Plaintiff incorporates all consistent paragraphs of this Complaint as if fully set forth under this count.

53. At all times material, Br. Hicks was employed by Defendants and was under each Defendant's direct supervision, employ, and control when he committed the wrongful acts alleged herein. Br. Hicks engaged in the wrongful conduct while acting in the course and scope of his employment with Defendants and/or accomplished the sexual abuse by virtue of his job-created authority.

54. Defendants had a duty, arising from their employment of Br. Hicks, to ensure that Br. Hicks did not sexually molest children.

55. Further, Defendants owed a duty to train and educate employees and administrators and establish adequate and effective policies and procedures calculated to detect, prevent, and address inappropriate behavior and conduct between clerics and children.

56. Defendants were negligent in the training, supervision, and instruction of their

employees. Defendants failed to timely and properly educate, train, supervise, and/or monitor their agents or employees with regard to policies and procedures that should be followed when sexual abuse of a child is suspected or observed.

57. Defendants were additionally negligent in failing to supervise, monitor, chaperone, and/or investigate Br. Hicks and/or in failing to create, institute, and/or enforce rules, policies, procedures, and/or regulations to prevent Br. Hicks's sexual abuse of Plaintiff.

58. In failing to properly supervise Br. Hicks, and in failing to establish such training procedures for employees and administrators, Defendants failed to exercise the degree of care that a reasonably prudent person would have exercised under similar circumstances.

59. As a direct and proximate result of the foregoing, Plaintiff sustained physical, emotional, and psychological injuries, along with pain and suffering.

WHEREFORE, Plaintiff demands judgment against Defendants, jointly and/or severally, for compensatory damages, together with interest and costs in an unspecified amount, plus costs, disbursements, reasonable attorneys' fees, interest, and such other and further relief as the court deems just and equitable.

COUNT III: NEGLIGENT RETENTION

Plaintiff incorporates all consistent paragraphs of this Complaint as if fully set forth under this count.

60. At all times material, Br. Hicks was employed by Defendants and was under each Defendant's direct supervision, employ, and control when he committed the wrongful acts alleged herein.

61. Defendants became aware or should have become aware of Br. Hicks's propensity for sexual abuse, and failed to take any further action to remedy the problem and failed to

investigate or remove Br. Hicks from working with children.

62. Defendants negligently retained Br. Hicks with knowledge of Br. Hicks's propensity for the type of behavior which resulted in Plaintiff's injuries in this action.

63. Defendants negligently retained Br. Hicks in a position where he had access to children and could foreseeably cause harm which Plaintiff would not have been subjected to had Defendants taken reasonable care.

64. In failing to timely remove Br. Hicks from working with children or terminate the employment of Br. Hicks, Defendants failed to exercise the degree of care that a reasonably prudent person would have exercised under similar circumstances.

65. As a direct and proximate result of the foregoing, Plaintiff sustained physical, emotional, and psychological injuries, along with pain and suffering.

WHEREFORE, Plaintiff demands judgment against Defendants, jointly and/or severally, for compensatory damages, together with interest and costs in an unspecified amount, plus costs, disbursements, reasonable attorneys' fees, interest, and such other and further relief as the court deems just and equitable.

DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL

The Plaintiff demands a trial by jury on all of the triable issues of this Complaint, pursuant to New Jersey Court Rules 1:8-2(b) and 4:35-1(a).

RULE 4:5-1 CERTIFICATION

I hereby certify that the matter in controversy is not the subject of any other pending and/or contemplated action or pending and or contemplated proceeding. I know of no other parties who should be joined in this action at this time.

GIANFORCARO LAW

JEFF ANDERSON & ASSOCIATES PA

/s/ Gregory G. Gianforcaro
Gregory G. Gianforcaro, Esq.
Attorneys for Plaintiff

/s/ Jeffrey R. Anderson / Trusha P. Goffe
Jeffrey R. Anderson, Esq.
Trusha P. Goffe, Esq.
Attorneys for Plaintiff

Dated: December 2, 2019

DESIGNATION OF TRIAL COUNSEL

Pursuant to Rule 4:25-4, Plaintiff hereby designates Gregory G. Gianforcaro, Esq. as trial counsel for Plaintiff.

GIANFORCARO LAW

JEFF ANDERSON & ASSOCIATES PA

/s/ Gregory G. Gianforcaro
Gregory G. Gianforcaro, Esq.
Attorneys for Plaintiff

/s/ Jeffrey R. Anderson / Trusha P. Goffe
Jeffrey R. Anderson, Esq.
Trusha P. Goffe, Esq.
Attorneys for Plaintiff

Dated: December 2, 2019

Civil Case Information Statement

Case Details: CAMDEN | Civil Part Docket# L-004838-19

Case Caption: DOE 1 JA/GG VS DIOCESE OF CAMDEN

Case Initiation Date: 12/02/2019

Attorney Name: GREGORY GEORGE GIANFORCARO

Firm Name: GREGORY G. GIANFORCARO, ATTORNEY
AT LAW

Address: 80 SOUTH MAIN STREET

PHILLIPSBURG NJ 08865

Phone: 9088592200

Name of Party: PLAINTIFF : DOE 1, JA/GG

Name of Defendant's Primary Insurance Company

(if known): Unknown

Case Type: PERSONAL INJURY

Document Type: Complaint with Jury Demand

Jury Demand: YES - 6 JURORS

Is this a professional malpractice case? NO

Related cases pending: NO

If yes, list docket numbers:

Do you anticipate adding any parties (arising out of same transaction or occurrence)? NO

THE INFORMATION PROVIDED ON THIS FORM CANNOT BE INTRODUCED INTO EVIDENCE

CASE CHARACTERISTICS FOR PURPOSES OF DETERMINING IF CASE IS APPROPRIATE FOR MEDIATION

Do parties have a current, past, or recurrent relationship? NO

If yes, is that relationship:

Does the statute governing this case provide for payment of fees by the losing party? NO

Use this space to alert the court to any special case characteristics that may warrant individual management or accelerated disposition:

Sexual Abuse Matter pursuant to new statute of limitations law

Do you or your client need any disability accommodations? NO

If yes, please identify the requested accommodation:

Will an interpreter be needed? NO

If yes, for what language:

Please check off each applicable category: Putative Class Action? NO **Title 59?** NO

I certify that confidential personal identifiers have been redacted from documents now submitted to the court, and will be redacted from all documents submitted in the future in accordance with *Rule 1:38-7(b)*

12/02/2019

Dated

/s/ GREGORY GEORGE GIANFORCARO

Signed