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8 **SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA**
9 **FOR THE COUNTY OF ORANGE**

10)
11 JANE DOE OG 1004, an individual)
12) Plaintiff,)
13) vs.)

14)
15)
16 DOE 1, a Corporation Sole,)
17 DOE 2, a Domestic Non-Profit, and)
18 DOE 3 through DOE 100.)
19) Defendant(s).)
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Case No. 30-2019-01120336-CU-PO-CJC
Judge Sheila Fell

COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES:

- 1. **NEGLIGENCE—NEGLIGENT SUPERVISION, NEGLIGENT RETENTION**
- 2. **NEGLIGENCE- NEGLIGENT SUPERVISION OF PLAINTIFF, THEN A MINOR**

Filed Pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure Section 340.1, as amended by Assembly Bill 218

DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL

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COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES

Based upon information and belief available to Plaintiff JANE DOE OG 1004 (“Plaintiff”) at the time of the filing of this Complaint, Plaintiff alleges as follows against Defendants DOE 1, a Corporation Sole, DOE 2, a domestic non-profit entity, and DOE 3 through DOE 100 (collectively “Defendants”):

PARTIES

1. Plaintiff is a natural person who was the resident of the County of Orange, State of California, at all relevant times mentioned herein. The name utilized by Plaintiff in this Complaint is a fictitious name used to protect her privacy as a victim of childhood sexual assault, as defined by section 340.1 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Plaintiff was born in 1980. Plaintiff was a minor throughout the period of childhood sexual assault alleged herein. Plaintiff brings this Complaint pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure Section 340.1, as amended by Assembly Bill 218, for damages suffered as a result of childhood sexual assault.

2. Plaintiff is informed and believes and thereon alleges that at all times material hereto, Defendant DOE 1 was and continues to be a Corporation Sole, established in 1976, which includes, but is not limited to, civil corporations, decision making entities, officials, and employees, authorized to conduct business, incorporated in, and conducting business in the State of California, with its principal place of business at 13280 Chapman Avenue, Garden Grove, California 92840, in Orange County. Defendant DOE 1 purposely conducts substantial business operations in and throughout the State of California and County of Orange. Defendant DOE 1 is responsible for Roman Catholic Church operations in and throughout Orange County, California. DOE 1 is responsible for the funding, staffing and direction of the parishes, parochial schools, fraternal organizations and other facilities and institutions within the geographic area of the County of Orange. Defendant DOE 1 was the primary entity owning, operating, and controlling the activities and behavior of its employees and agents at Defendant DOE 2, including Mr. “Bernie” Balsis (“PERPETRATOR”), DOE 3 through DOE 100, and all other employees, agents and supervisors of Defendants. Plaintiff is further informed, believes and thereon alleges that Defendant DOE 1 had sole authority and responsibility to control and supervise the actions of PERPETRATOR.

1 3. Plaintiff is informed and believes and thereon alleges that at all times material
2 hereto, Defendant DOE 1 employed PERPETRATOR as an agent and had the ability to control and
3 supervise PERPETRATOR's activities. Defendant DOE 1 was an entity that supervised its
4 employees and agents, including its priests, teachers, counselors and administrators, who supervised
5 minor children, including those on its premises and in its programs. At all times material hereto,
6 PERPETRATOR was under the direct supervision, employ, and control of Defendant DOE 1, a
7 Corporation sole. PERPETRATOR physically perpetrated acts of childhood sexual assault upon
8 Plaintiff when Plaintiff was a minor.

9 4. Plaintiff is informed and believes and thereon alleges that at all times material
10 hereto, Defendant DOE 2 was and is a religious institution organized under the laws of the State of
11 California as a domestic non-profit, which includes, but is not limited to, civil corporations,
12 decision making entities, officials and employees authorized to conduct business and conducting
13 business in the State of California, with its principle place of business in Santa Ana, California. At
14 all times material, Defendant DOE 2 was and continues to be under the direct authority, control and
15 province of Defendant DOE 1 and the Bishop of DOE 1. DOE 2 includes, but is not limited to, the
16 school corporation and entity. Defendant DOE 2 is responsible for the funding, staffing, and
17 direction of a Catholic school located at 1202 W. Edinger, Santa Ana, California.

18 5. Plaintiff is informed and believes and thereon alleges that PERPETRATOR was an
19 employee, agent and counselor of DOE 1, DOE 2, and DOES 3 through 100, and was assigned to
20 work at DOE 2 at the time of the abuse of Plaintiff.

21 6. Plaintiff is informed and believes and thereon alleges that the true names and
22 capacities, whether individual, corporate, associate or otherwise, of Defendants named herein as
23 Defendant DOE 3 through DOE 100, inclusive, are currently unknown to Plaintiff, who therefore
24 sues DOE Defendants by such fictitious names, and who will amend the Complaint to show their
25 true names and capacities when such names have been ascertained. Plaintiff is informed and
26 believes and thereon alleges that DOE Defendants are legally responsible in some manner for the
27 events, happenings, and/or tortious and unlawful conduct that caused the injuries and damages
28 alleged in this Complaint.

1 throughout the world, including the Bishop of DOE 1. The instruction was binding upon the Bishop
2 of DOE 1 until 2001. The instruction directed that allegations and reports of childhood sexual
3 abuse by DOE 1's agents and/or employees were required to be kept secret and not disclosed either
4 to civil authorities such as law enforcement, to co-employees or supervisors of parish priests, or to
5 parishioners generally.

6 13. Defendant DOE 1's procedure requires Bishops to keep *subsecreto* files also known
7 as confidential files. These files are not to be made public.

8 14. Because of problems of sexual misconduct (including childhood sexual assault) of
9 Catholic clergy and agents/employees of Defendant DOE 1 the Catholic Church and other
10 organizations sponsored treatment centers for priests that had been involved in sexual misconduct.
11 One such treatment center is the Saint John Vianney Center, (founded in 1946) represented on its
12 public website that is/was "the longest running, internationally renowned, behavioral health facility
13 in North America for Clergy and Religious." Similarly, a different treatment center, the Servants of
14 the Paraclete represented that it "is an international religious community founded... in 1947 with a
15 specific ministry to serve fellow priests and brothers who are facing particular challenge in their
16 vocations and lives" with locations in across the country, including in the states of Missouri and
17 New Mexico. The Saint Luke Institute, is a third similar treatment provider for agents of DOE 1
18 and 2, among others, who engage in sexual misconduct and has treatment centers in Maryland,
19 Kentucky, and Missouri. Defendants have engaged in and extended this conduct to include sexual
20 abuse by its agents/employees.

21 15. Sexual abuse of minors by Catholic clergy has been a reality in the Catholic Church
22 for centuries but has remained covered by deep secrecy. This secrecy is rooted in the official
23 policies of the Catholic Church which are applicable to all dioceses and in fact are part of the
24 practices of each diocese, including Defendant DOE 1. Sexual abuse of minors by Catholic clergy
25 and religious leaders became publicly known in the mid-1980s as a result of media coverage of a
26 case in Lafayette, Louisiana. Since that time, the media has continued to expose cases of clergy
27 sexual abuse throughout the United States. In spite of these revelations as well as the many criminal
28 and civil litigations the Church has been involved in as a result of clergy sexual abuse of minors, the

1 bishops and other Church leaders continued to pursue a policy of secrecy. Defendants have engaged
2 in and extended this conduct to include sexual abuse by its agents/employees.

3 16. All of the procedures required in the so-called "Dallas Charter" have been previously
4 mandated by Defendant DOE 1 and in the 1922 and 1962 documents, but were consistently ignored
5 by Catholic Bishops. In place of the required processes, which would have kept a written record of
6 cases of clergy sexual abuse, the Bishops applied a policy of clandestine transfer of accused priests
7 from one local or diocesan assignment to another or from one diocese to another. The receiving
8 parishioners and often the receiving pastors were not informed of any accusations of sexual abuse of
9 minors. Defendants have engaged in and extended this conduct to include sexual abuse by its
10 agents/employees.

11 17. Refusal to disclose sexually abusive clerics and/or employees and agents to
12 parishioners and even fellow clerics has been on way utilized by Defendant DOE 1, Defendant
13 DOE 2, and DOE Defendants to maintain secrecy. Another has been to use various forms of
14 persuasion on victims or their families to convince them to remain silent about incidents of abuse.
15 These forms of persuasion have included methods that have ranged from sympathetic attempts to
16 gain silence to direct intimidation to various kinds of threats. In so doing, the clergy involved, from
17 Bishops to priests, have relied on their power to overwhelm victims and their families.

18 18. Plaintiff was sexually assaulted by PERPETRATOR. PERPETRATOR's sexual
19 assault of Plaintiff is a result of Defendant DOE 1 and Defendant DOE 2's cover up, as statutorily
20 defined by Code of Civil Procedure section 340.1 (b).

21 19. Plaintiff was raised in the County of Orange in a devoutly Catholic family and was a
22 student at Defendant DOE 2. When Plaintiff was a young child, Plaintiff and Plaintiff's family
23 attended DOE 2, which was owned, operated, controlled and run by Defendant DOE 1 and
24 Defendant DOE 2. Plaintiff and Plaintiff's family came in contact with PERPETRATOR as an
25 agent and representative of Defendants, and at DOE 2.

26 20. Plaintiff participated in youth activities and educational activities at DOE 2. Plaintiff
27 was educated and taught the theology and tenets of the Roman Catholic Church on matters of faith,
28 morals and religious doctrine. Plaintiff therefore developed great admiration, trust, reverence,

1 respect for, and obedience to the Roman Catholic Church and clergy and lay
2 employee/agents/counselors/teachers who occupied positions of great influence and persuasion as
3 holy men and/or authority figures, as well as for the administration at DOE 2. Plaintiff was
4 encouraged to trust, respect, and obey PERPETRATOR by and through Defendant DOE 1,
5 Defendant DOE 2, and Defendants DOE 3 through 100.

6 21. As a minor, Plaintiff regularly engaged with agents employed by Defendant DOE 1
7 through her schooling at DOE 2 including, but not limited to Perpetrator, a counselor. Accordingly,
8 a special relationship was formed between Plaintiff, then a minor, and Defendants.

9 22. During and through these activities, Plaintiff, as a minor and vulnerable child, was
10 dependent on Defendants and their agents, including PERPETRATOR. Plaintiff was under the
11 custody and control of Defendant DOE 1 and Defendant DOE 2, who had control over Plaintiff's
12 welfare and who were responsible for running DOE 2 with a duty to protect Plaintiff because he
13 was in a special relationship with Defendant DOE 1, Defendant DOE 2, and DOE Defendants.
14 Defendant DOE 1 and Defendant DOE 2 had accepted the entrustment of Plaintiff and had
15 responsibility for Plaintiff and authority over Plaintiff.

16 23. In approximately 1995, when Plaintiff was approximately 15 years old and a student
17 of Defendant DOE 1 and Defendant DOE 2, PERPETRATOR committed acts of childhood sexual
18 assault against Plaintiff. While performing his duties as a counselor for Defendants, and for the
19 purpose of furthering the duties required in that role, PERPETRATOR befriended Plaintiff and
20 gained Plaintiff's trust and confidence as a counselor, spiritual guide, authority figure, and
21 trustworthy mentor.

22 24. Seeing PERPETRATOR as a trustworthy mentor, Plaintiff was conditioned to
23 comply with PERPETRATOR's direction and to respect him as a person of authority in spiritual,
24 ethical, and educational matters. PERPETRATOR's conduct constituted "grooming" of Plaintiff
25 and culminated in his sexual assault of Plaintiff.

26 25. PERPETRATOR utilized Defendants' facilities and institutions to gain access to
27 Plaintiff. At all relevant times, PERPETRATOR was held out as a trustworthy, moral and authority
28 figure. This signified to people that PERPETRATOR was in good standing and authorized by

1 Defendants to act as a priest and agent of Defendants'. It was by virtue of PERPETRATOR's
2 position as a teacher/counselor of Defendants that he met and groomed Plaintiff, established trust
3 with Plaintiff, and manipulated that trust in order to sexually assault and abuse Plaintiff.

4 26. PERPETRATOR committed acts of childhood sexual assault against Plaintiff on the
5 premises owned, operated, and controlled by Defendant DOE 1 and Defendant DOE 2, including in
6 Perpetrator's office at DOE 2. PERPETRATOR's sexual assault of Plaintiff included, but was not
7 limited to: PERPETRATOR summoning Plaintiff into his office under the guise of providing
8 counseling services. PERPETRATOR proceeded to tell Plaintiff that he loved her, hugged her and
9 pressed his erect penis against her while his hands were underneath her skirt manipulating her
10 buttocks.

11 27. PERPETRATOR sexually abused Plaintiff for sexual gratification and was, at least
12 in part, based on the Plaintiff's gender and age, who was a minor child at the time.

13 28. This childhood sexual abuse constitutes "childhood sexual assault" pursuant to Code
14 of Civil Procedure section 340.1(d) as amended by Assembly Bill 218, including any act committed
15 against Plaintiff that occurred when the Plaintiff was under the age of 18 years and that would have
16 been proscribed by Section 266j of the Penal Code; Section 285 of the Penal Code; paragraph (1)
17 or (2) of subdivision (b), or of subdivision (c), of Section 286 of the Penal Code; subdivision (a) or
18 (b) of Section 288 of the Penal Code; paragraph (1) or (2) of subdivision (b), or of subdivision (c),
19 of Section 287 or of former Section 288a of the Penal Code; subdivision (h), (i), or (j) of Section
20 289 of the Penal Code; any sexual conduct as defined in paragraph (1) of subdivision (d) of Section
21 311.4 of the Penal Code; Section 647.6 of the Penal Code; and/or any prior laws of this state of
22 similar effect at the time the act was committed.

23 29. Plaintiff did not, and was unable to give free or voluntary consent to the sexual acts
24 perpetrated against Plaintiff by PERPETRATOR, as Plaintiff was a minor child at the time of the
25 abuse alleged herein.

26 30. By using his position within Defendants' institutions, Defendant DOE 1, Defendant
27 DOE 2, DOE Defendants and PERPETRATOR, demanded and required that Plaintiff respect
28 PERPETRATOR in his position as a teacher, school administrator, advisor, confidant, counselor

1 and mentor for Defendants.

2 31. As a direct and proximate result of PERPETRATOR's childhood sexual assault
3 against Plaintiff, which was enabled and facilitated by Defendants, and each of them, Plaintiff has
4 suffered and will continue to suffer physical, psychological, emotional and economic harm in a sum
5 to be proven at the time of trial.

6 32. As a direct and proximate result of Plaintiff's sexual abuse by PERPETRATOR,
7 which was enabled and facilitated by Defendants, and each of them, Plaintiff has suffered economic
8 injury, all to Plaintiff's general, special and consequential damage in an amount to be proven at
9 trial, but in no event less than the minimum jurisdictional amount of this Court.

10 33. PERPETRATOR at all times material hereto was an employee, agent and/or
11 representative of Defendant DOE 1, Defendant DOE 2, and all DOE Defendants. PERPETRATOR
12 engaged in unlawful sexual conduct with Plaintiff when Plaintiff was a minor. Defendants are
13 vicariously liable for the childhood sexual abuse committed by PERPETRATOR, including but not
14 limited to through the theories of respondent superior, ratification, and authorization.
15 PERPETRATOR's childhood sexual misconduct with Plaintiff occurred while he was functioning
16 on behalf of Defendants, and was made possible because of that agency.

17 34. By allowing a the perpetrator to have his position of trust as a counselor at DOE 2,
18 and by hold himself out as a counselor, DOE 1 and DOE 2 are certifying that the PERPETRATOR
19 is in good standing and sexually safe.

20 35. The Defendants ratified and authorized PERPETRATOR's childhood sexual abuse
21 of Plaintiff by (1) failing to discharge, dismiss, discipline, suspend and/or supervise
22 PERPETRATOR or other teachers, priests, employees and agents known by Defendants to have
23 sexually abused children, or to have been accused of sexually abusing children, (2) actively
24 shielding PERPETRATOR from responsibility for his childhood sexual assault of Plaintiff and
25 other minors, (3) failing to acknowledge the existence of complaints against PERPETRATOR of
26 childhood sexual assault on Plaintiff and minors, (4) failing to report such complaints to civil or
27 criminal authorities, (5) providing financial support to PERPETRATOR during and/or after the
28 childhood sexual abuse of Plaintiff and/or other minors, and (6) failing to take steps to timely

1 remove PERPETRATOR so as to permanently prevent him from using his authority bestowed upon
2 him by Defendants to gain access to minors and sexually abuse them.

3 36. By taking the above wrongful, negligent, and/or intentional actions and/or failing to
4 act after having knowledge or having reason to know of such childhood sexual abuse of Plaintiff
5 and/or other minors, Defendants ratified and authorized PERPETRATOR's sexual abuse of minors.
6 By ratifying PERPETRATOR's sexual abuse of minors, Defendants in legal effect committed and
7 caused the childhood sexual abuse of Plaintiff when Plaintiff was a minor.

8 37. Defendants have failed to uphold numerous mandatory duties imposed upon them by
9 state and federal law, and by written policies and procedures applicable to Defendants.

10 38. As a minor at DOE 2, which was owned, operated, and controlled by the Defendants,
11 and where PERPETRATOR was employed, retained, and worked, Plaintiff was under Defendants'
12 direct supervision, care, and control. This constituted a special relationship, fiduciary relationship
13 and/or special care relationship between Plaintiff and Defendants. Additionally, as a minor child
14 under the custody, care, and control of Defendants, Defendants stood *in loco parentis* with respect
15 to Plaintiff while Plaintiff was at DOE 2. As the responsible parties and/or employers controlling
16 PERPETRATOR, the Defendants were also in a special relationship with Plaintiff, and owed
17 special duties to Plaintiff.

18 39. Defendants knew or had reason to know, or were otherwise on notice, that
19 PERPETRATOR had engaged in unlawful sexual-related conduct with minors in the past, and/or
20 was continuing to engage in such conduct with Plaintiff, and failed to take reasonable steps, and to
21 implement reasonable safeguards, to avoid acts of unlawful sexual conduct in the future by
22 PERPETRATOR.

23 40. Defendants had a duty to disclose these facts to Plaintiff, Plaintiff's parents and
24 others, but negligently and/or intentionally suppressed, concealed, or failed to disclose this
25 information for the express purposes of maintaining PERPETRATOR's image as an ethical,
26 wholesome, safe, and trusted leader, counselor and school administrator at and within the
27 institutions run by the Defendants. The duty to disclose this information arose from the special,
28 trusting, confidential, fiduciary, and *in loco parentis* relationship between Defendants and Plaintiff.

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NEGLIGENCE
(As to ALL Defendants)

46. Plaintiff repeats, re-alleges and incorporates herein by reference all consistent paragraphs of this Complaint as if fully set forth herein.

47. Defendants' conduct, actions, and omissions served to create an environment in which PERPETRATOR was afforded years of continuous secluded access to minor children, including Plaintiff, who was approximately 15 years of age at the time PERPETRATOR committed acts of childhood sexual assault against Plaintiff.

48. At the time PERPETRATOR performed the acts alleged herein it was or should have been reasonably foreseeable to Defendants that by continuously exposing and making Plaintiff available to PERPETRATOR, Defendants were placing Plaintiff at grave risk of being sexually assaulted by PERPETRATOR. By knowingly subjecting Plaintiff to this foreseeable danger, Defendants were duty-bound to take reasonable steps and implement reasonable safeguards to protect Plaintiff from PERPETRATOR. Further, at all times alleged herein, Defendants possessed a sufficient degree of control over PERPETRATOR's personal and business affairs so as to keep PERPETRATOR away from Plaintiff and other minor children, and prevent any childhood sexual abuse against them. Defendants, however, failed to take reasonable steps or implement reasonable safeguards for Plaintiff's protection.

49. As a direct and proximate result of Defendants' acts and omissions Plaintiff has suffered and will continue to suffer physical, psychological, emotional and economic harm in a sum to be proven at the time of trial.

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NEGLIGENT SUPERVISION OF PERPETRATOR

50. Defendants owed Plaintiff a duty to provide reasonable supervision over PERPETRATOR, to use reasonable care in investigating PERPETRATOR's background, and to provide adequate warning to the Plaintiff, and others, of PERPETRATOR's dangerous propensities.

51. Defendants, by and through their respective agents, servants and employees, knew or had reason to know of PERPETRATOR's dangerous and exploitive propensities. Despite such knowledge, Defendants negligently failed to supervise PERPETRATOR, a supervisor of minor

1 children with the propensity and ability to commit wrongful acts against Plaintiff. Defendants
2 failed to provide reasonable supervisions of PERPETRATOR, failed to use reasonable care in
3 investigating PERPETRATOR, and failed to provide adequate warning to Plaintiff and others of
4 PERPETRATOR's dangerous propensities and unfitness. Defendants further failed to take
5 reasonable measures to prevent the childhood sexual assault, abuse, and harassment of minor
6 children, including Plaintiff.

7 52. As an institution entrusted with the care of minors, where staff, employees, agents,
8 and management, such as PERPETRATOR, were placed in contact with minor children, the
9 Defendants expressly and implicitly represented that these individuals, including PERPETRATOR,
10 were not a threat to children and others who would fall under PERPETRATOR's influence, control,
11 direction, and guidance.

12 53. Defendants were aware or had reason to have been aware of how vulnerable children
13 were to sexual harassment, assault, and abuse by mentors, advisors, teachers, counselor and other
14 persons of authority within the Defendants.

15 54. Defendants breached their duty to Plaintiff by, *inter alia*, failing to adequately
16 monitor and supervise PERPETRATOR and failing to stop PERPETRATOR from committing
17 wrongful sexual acts with minors, including Plaintiff. Plaintiff is informed and believes that
18 employees, staff and agents of Defendants knew and/or suspected the abuse was occurring at the
19 time and failed to investigate the matter further.

20 55. As a direct and proximate result of Defendants' acts and omissions Plaintiff has
21 suffered and will continue to suffer physical, psychological, emotional and economic harm in a sum
22 to be proven at the time of trial.

23 **NEGLIGENT RETENTION OF PERPETRATOR**

24 56. Defendants owed Plaintiff a duty not to retain PERPETRATOR given his pedophile
25 propensities, which Defendants knew or had reason to know had they engaged in a meaningful and
26 adequate investigation of his background.

27 57. As institutions entrusted with the care of minors, where staff, employees, agents and
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1 management, such as PERPETRATOR were placed in contact with minors, Defendants expressly
2 and implicitly represented that these individuals, including PERPETRATOR, were not a sexual
3 threat to children and others who would fall under PERPETRATOR's influence, control, direction
4 and guidance.

5 58. Nevertheless, although Defendants knew or had reason to know, suspected or
6 otherwise had been on notice that PERPETRATOR was a pedophile, that he had sexually assaulted
7 other minors, that PERPETRATOR was and had sexually assaulted Plaintiff, and that Plaintiff had
8 complained about PERPETRATOR's inappropriate touching, Defendants refused to protect
9 Plaintiff from PERPETRATOR and/or report him to law enforcement.

10 59. As a direct and proximate result of Defendants' acts and omissions Plaintiff has
11 suffered and will continue to suffer physical, psychological, emotional and economic harm in a sum
12 to be proven at the time of trial.

13 **SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION**

14 **NEGLIGENCE**

15 **(As to ALL Defendants)**

16 **NEGLIGENT SUPERVISION OF PLAINTIFF, THEN A MINOR**

17 60. Plaintiff repeats, re-alleges and incorporates herein by reference all consistent
18 paragraphs of this Complaint as if fully set forth herein.

19 61. Plaintiff's Second Cause of action is an alternative additional theory of liability as
20 alleged as against DOE 1, DOE 2, and DOE 3 through DOE 100.

21 62. Defendant DOE 1, a corporation sole, Defendant DOE 2, and Defendants DOE 3
22 through DOE 100 are liable for the acts and omissions of their employees and agents, including
23 PERPETRATOR, acting within the course and scope of their employment and/or agency. At all
24 times herein, Defendant DOE 1, Defendant DOE 2, and Defendants DOE 3 through DOE 100's
25 employees, including PERPETRATOR, were acting within the course and scope of their
26 employment.

27 63. Defendant DOE 1, Defendant DOE 2, and Defendants DOE 3 through DOE 100 had
28 a duty to provide supervision of Plaintiff, a minor, and to use reasonable care in supervising

1 Plaintiff, a minor, when Plaintiff was involved in activities sponsored, supervised, organized,
2 directed, and/or operated by Defendant DOE 1, Defendant DOE 2, and Defendants DOE 3 through
3 DOE 100, or their agents and employees.

4 64. Defendant DOE 1, Defendant DOE 2, and Defendants DOE 3 through DOE 100
5 breached their duty of care.

6 65. Defendant DOE 1, Defendant DOE 2, and Defendants DOE 3 through DOE 100
7 negligently failed to properly and/or adequately supervise Plaintiff, a minor, and failed to use
8 reasonable care in protecting Plaintiff, a minor, from PERPETRATOR's misconduct that created a
9 risk of childhood sexual assault while Plaintiff, a minor, was involved in activities sponsored,
10 supervised, organized, directed, and/or operated by Defendant DOE 1, Defendant DOE 2, and
11 Defendants DOE 3 through DOE 100's and their agents and/or employees.

12 66. Defendant DOE 1, Defendant DOE 2, and Defendants DOE 3 through DOE 100's
13 breach was a substantial factor in PERPETRATOR's childhood sexual assault of Plaintiff.

14 67. As a direct, legal, and proximate cause of Defendant DOE 1, Defendant DOE 2, and
15 Defendants DOE 3 through DOE 100's acts, omissions and/or negligence, PERPETRATOR
16 committed acts of childhood sexual assault against Plaintiff.

17 68. As a direct and proximate result of Defendants' acts and omissions Plaintiff has
18 suffered and will continue to suffer physical, psychological, emotional and economic harm in a sum
19 to be proven at the time of trial.

20 **PRAYER FOR RELIEF**

21 WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays for the following relief against Defendants:

22 1. For damages for past and future medical, psychotherapy, and related expenses
23 according to proof at the time of trial;

24 2. For general damages for physical and mental pain and suffering and emotional
25 distress in a sum to be proven at the time of trial;

26 3. For damages for past loss wages and past earning capacity and/or future lost wages
27 and loss of earning capacity according to proof at the time of trial;

28 4. For treble damages against Defendant DOE 1, a corporation sole, Defendant DOE 2,

1 a religious entity form unknown, and Defendants DOE 3 through DOE 100, as authorized by
2 section 340.1 of the Code of Civil Procedure;

3 5. For interest as allowed by law;

4 6. For costs of suit herein; and

5 7. For such other and further relief as the Court deems proper.

6 DATED: December 23, 2019

JEFF ANDERSON & ASSOCIATES

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Attorneys for Plaintiff JANE DOE OG 1004

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DEMAND FOR TRIAL

Plaintiff JANE DOE OG 1004 hereby demands a trial by jury in this matter.

DATED: December 23, 2019, 2019

JEFF ANDERSON & ASSOCIATES



MICHAEL RECK
MICHAEL G. FINNEGAN
JENNIFER E. STEIN
Attorneys for Plaintiff JANE DOE OG 1004