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8	Attorneys for Plaintiff JOHN DOE SJ 1007			
9	SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA			
10	FOR THE COUNTY	OF SANTA CLARA Case No.		
12	JOHN DOE SJ 1007, an individual) COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES:		
13	Plaintiff,) 1. NEGLIGENCE—NEGLIGENT		
14	VS.	SUPERVISION, NEGLIGENT RETENTION		
15) 2. NEGLIGENCE- NEGLIGENT		
16	DOE 1, a Religious Corporation Sole,	SUPERVISION OF PLAINTIFF- THEN A MINOR		
17	DOE 2, a Religious Corporation Sole,)) Filed Pursuant to		
18	DOE 3, a Religious Order,	Code of Civil Procedure Section 340.1, as amended by Assembly Bill 218		
19	DOE 4, a Religious School, and)) DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL		
20	DOE 5 through DOE 100.))		
21	Defendant(s).			
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	- 1 - COMPLAINT AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL			

COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES

Based upon information and belief available to Plaintiff JOHN DOE SJ 1007 ("Plaintiff") at the time of the filing of this Complaint, Plaintiff alleges as follows against Defendants DOE 1, a Religious Corporation Sole, DOE 2, a Religious Corporation Sole, DOE 3, a Religious Order, DOE 4, a Religious School and DOE 5 through DOE 100 (collectively "Defendants"):

PARTIES

- 1. Plaintiff is a natural person who was the resident of the County of Santa Clara, State of California, at all relevant times mentioned herein. The name utilized by Plaintiff in this Complaint is a fictitious name used to protect Plaintiff's privacy as a victim of childhood sexual assault, as defined by section 340.1 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Plaintiff was born in 1953. Plaintiff was a minor throughout the period of childhood sexual assault alleged herein. Plaintiff brings this Complaint pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure Section 340.1, as amended by Assembly Bill 218, for damages suffered as a result of childhood sexual assault.
- 2. Plaintiff is informed and believes and thereon alleges that at all times material hereto, Defendant DOE 1 was and continues to be a Religious Corporation Sole, which includes but is not limited to civil corporations, decision making entities, officials, and employees, authorized to conduct business, incorporated in, and conducting business in the State of California, with its principal place of business in San Francisco County, California. Defendant DOE 1 purposely conducts substantial business operations in and throughout the State of California and San Francisco County. Defendant DOE 1 is responsible for Roman Catholic Church operations in San Francisco County, California. DOE 1 is responsible for the funding, staffing and direction of the parishes, parochial schools, fraternal organizations and other facilities and institutions within the geographic area of the San Francisco County, and encompasses other counties in Northern California.

 Defendant DOE 1 was the primary entity owning, operating and controlling the activities and behavior of its employees and agents at Defendant DOE 2, DOE 3, DOE 4 and also including Brother William Farrington ("PERPETRATOR"), DOE 5 through DOE 100, and all other employees, agents and supervisors of Defendants. Plaintiff is further informed, believes and

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thereon alleges that Defendant DOE 1 had sole authority and responsibility to control and supervise the ministry of PERPETRATOR.

- 3. Plaintiff is informed and believes and thereon alleges that at all times material hereto, Defendant DOE 1 employed PERPETRATOR as an agent and had the ability to control and supervise PERPETRATOR's activities. Defendant DOE 1 was an entity that supervised its employees and agents, including its priests, teachers, and administrators, who supervised minor children, including those on its premises and in its programs. At all times material hereto, PERPETRATOR was under the direct supervision, employ, and control of Defendant DOE 1, a Corporation sole. PERPETRATOR physically perpetrated acts of childhood sexual assault upon Plaintiff when Plaintiff was a minor.
- 4. Plaintiff is informed and believes and thereon alleges that at all times material hereto, Defendant DOE 2 was and continues to be a Religious Corporation Sole, which includes but is not limited to civil corporations, decision making entities, officials, and employees, authorized to conduct business, incorporated in, and conducting business in the State of California, with its principal place of business in San Francisco County, California. Defendant DOE 2 purposely conducts substantial business operations in and throughout the State of California and San Francisco County. Defendant DOE 2 is responsible for Roman Catholic Church operations in San Francisco County, California. DOE 2 is responsible for the funding, staffing and direction of the parishes, parochial schools, fraternal organizations and other facilities and institutions within the geographic area of the San Francisco County, and encompasses other counties in Northern California. Defendant DOE 2 was the primary entity owning, operating and controlling the activities and behavior of its employees and agents at Defendant DOE 2, including PERPETRATOR, DOE 5 through DOE 100, and all other employees, agents and supervisors of Defendants. Plaintiff is further informed, believes and thereon alleges that Defendant DOE 2 had authority and responsibility to control and supervise the ministry of PERPETRATOR
- 5. Plaintiff is informed and believes and thereon alleges that at all times material hereto, Defendant DOE 2 employed PERPETRATOR as an agent and had the ability to control and supervise PERPETRATOR's activities. Defendant DOE 2 was an entity that supervised its

employees and agents, including its priests, teachers, and administrators, who supervised minor children, including those on its premises and in its programs. At all times material hereto, PERPETRATOR was under the direct supervision, employ, and control of Defendant DOE 2, a Corporation sole.

- 6. Plaintiff is informed and believes and thereon alleges that at all times material hereto, Defendant DOE 3, a Religious Order employed PERPETRATOR as an agent and had the ability to control and supervise PERPETRATOR's activities. Defendant DOE 3 was an entity that supervised its employees and agents, including its priests, teachers, and administrators, who supervised minor children, including those on its premises and in its programs. At all times material hereto, PERPETRATOR was under the direct supervision, employ, and control of Defendant DOE 3, a Religious Order.
- 7. Plaintiff is informed and believes and thereon alleges that at all times material hereto, Defendant DOE 4, a Religious School employed PERPETRATOR as an agent and had the ability to control and supervise PERPETRATOR's activities. Defendant DOE 4 was an entity that supervised its employees and agents, including its priests, teachers, and administrators, who supervised minor children, including those on its premises and in its programs. At all times material hereto, PERPETRATOR was under the direct supervision, employ, and control of Defendant DOE 4, a Religious School.
- 8. Plaintiff is informed and believes and thereon alleges that at all times material hereto, Defendant DOE 4 was and is a religious educational institution organized under the laws of the State of California as a religious entity of form unknown, which includes but is not limited to civil corporations, decision making entities, officials and employees authorized to conduct business and conducting business in the State of California, with its principle place of business in San Jose, California. At all times material, Defendant DOE 4 was and continues to be under the direct authority, control and province of Defendant DOE 1 and the Bishop, DOE 1. DOE 4 includes but is not limited to the educational corporation and entity. Defendant DOE 4 is responsible for the funding, staffing, and direction of a school employees, volunteers and agents located in San Jose California.

- 9. Plaintiff is informed and believes and thereon alleges that PERPETRATOR was a cleric with DOE 1, DOE 2, DOE 3, DOE 4 and DOE 5 through DOE 100.
- 10. DOE 1, DOE 2, DOE 3 DOE 4 and DOE 5 through DOE 100 are hereby referred to as "Defendants."
- 11. Plaintiff is informed and believes and thereon alleges that the true names and capacities, whether individual, corporate, associate or otherwise, of Defendants named herein as Defendant DOE 5 through DOE 100, inclusive, are currently unknown to Plaintiff, who therefore sues DOE Defendants by such fictitious names, and who will amend the Complaint to show their true names and capacities when such names have been ascertained. Plaintiff is informed and believes and thereon alleges that DOE Defendants are legally responsible in some manner for the events, happenings, and/or tortious and unlawful conduct that caused the injuries and damages alleged in this Complaint.
- 12. Plaintiff is informed and believes and thereon alleges that at all times material hereto there existed a unity of interest and ownership among Defendants and each of them, such that an individuality and separateness between Defendants ceased to exist. Defendants were the successors-in-interests and/or alter egos of the other Defendants in that they purchased, controlled, dominated and operated each other without any separate identity, observation of formalities, or any other separateness. To continue to maintain the façade of a separate and individual existence between and among Defendants, and each of them, would serve to perpetuate a fraud and injustice.
- 13. Plaintiff is informed and believes and thereon alleges that at all times material hereto, Defendants were the agents, representatives and/or employees of each and every other Defendant and were acting within the course and scope of said alternative personality, capacity, identity, agency, representation and/or employment and were within the scope of their authority, whether actual or apparent. At all times material hereto, Defendants were the trustees, partners, servants, joint venturers, shareholders, co-conspirators, contractors, and/or employees of each and every other Defendant, and the acts and omissions alleged herein were done by them, acting individually, through such capacity and within the scope of their authority and with the permission and consent of each and every other Defendant, and that such conduct was thereafter ratified by

each Defendant, and that each Defendant is jointly and severally liable to Plaintiff.

- 14. PERPETRATOR physically perpetrated acts of childhood sexual assault upon Plaintiff when Plaintiff was a minor
- 15. While religious belief is absolutely protected, conduct is not protected and the actions herein below were illegal secular motivated conduct that is regulated by the law.

FACTS

- 16. Plaintiff is informed and believes that PERPETRATOR was ordained a Roman Catholic priest and or brother in 1964. PERPETRATOR was employed by Defendant DOE 1. PERPETRATOR remained under the direct supervision, employ, and control of Defendants. Defendants placed PERPETRATOR in positions where he had access to and worked with children as an integral part of his work.
- 17. PERPETRATOR served as a religious brother at Defendants facilities.

 PERPETRATOR served the parishioners and students of Defendants.
 - 18. PERPETRATOR is known to have sexually assaulted children, other than Plaintiff.
- 19. In 1962, the Vatican in Rome issued a Papal Instruction binding upon all Bishops throughout the world, including the Bishop of DOE 1. The instruction was binding upon the Bishop of DOE 1 until 2001. The instruction directed that allegations and reports of childhood sexual abuse by priests were required to be kept secret and not disclosed either to civil authorities such as law enforcement, to co-employees or supervisors of parish priests, or to parishioners generally.
- 20. Defendant DOE 1's procedure requires Bishops to keep *subsecreto* files also known as confidential files. These files are not to be made public.
- 21. Because of problems of sexual misconduct (including childhood sexual abuse) of Catholic clergy, the Catholic Church and other organizations sponsored treatment centers for priests that had been involved in sexual misconduct. One such treatment center is the Saint John Vianney Center, (founded in 1946) represented on its public website that is/was "the longest running, internationally renowned, behavioral health facility in North America for Clergy and Religious." Similarly, a different treatment center, the Servants of the Paraclete represented that it "is an international religious community founded... in 1947 with a specific ministry to serve fellow priests

and brothers who are facing particular challenge in their vocations and lives" with locations in across the country, including in the states of Missouri and New Mexico. The Saint Luke Institute, is a third similar treatment provider for priest who engage in sexual misconduct and has treatment centers in Maryland, Kentucky, and Missouri.

- 22. Sexual abuse of clerics by Catholic clergy has been a reality in the Catholic Church for centuries but has remained covered by deep secrecy. This secrecy is rooted in the official policies of the Catholic Church which are applicable to all DOE 1s and in fact are part of the practices of each DOE 1, including Defendant DOE 1. Sexual abuse of minors by Catholic clergy and religious leaders became publicly known in the mid-1980s as a result of media coverage of a case in Lafayette, Louisiana. Since that time, the media has continued to expose cases of clergy sexual abuse throughout the United States. In spite of these revelations as well as the many criminal and civil litigations the Church has been involved in as a result of clergy sexual abuse of minors, the bishops and other Church leaders continued to pursue a policy of secrecy.
- 23. All of the procedures required in the so-called "Dallas Charter" have been previously mandated by Defendant DOE 1 and in the 1922 and 1962 documents, but were consistently ignored by Catholic Bishops. In place of the required processes, which would have kept a written record of cases of clergy sexual abuse, the Bishops applied a policy of clandestine transfer of accused priests from one local or diocesan assignment to another or from one DOE 1 to another. The receiving parishioners and often the receiving pastors were not informed of any accusations of sexual abuse of minors.
- 24. Refusal to disclose sexually abusive clerics to parishioners and even fellow clerics has been on way utilized by Defendant DOE 1, Defendant DOE 2, and DOE Defendants to maintain secrecy. Another has been to use various forms of persuasion on victims or their families to convince them to remain silent about incidents of abuse. These forms of persuasion have included methods that have ranged from sympathetic attempts to gain silence to direct intimidation to various kinds of threats. In so doing, the clergy involved, from Bishops to priests, have relied on their power to overwhelm victims and their families.
 - 25. Plaintiff was sexually assaulted by PERPETRATOR. PERPETRATOR's sexual

assault of Plaintiff is a result of Defendant DOE 1 and Defendant DOE 2 cover up, as statutorily defined by Code of Civil Procedure section 340.1 (b).

- 26. Plaintiff was raised in a devoutly Catholic family, was baptized, confirmed, and served as an altar server and celebrated weekly mass and received the sacraments through their Church and School. When Plaintiff was a young child, Plaintiff and Plaintiff's family attended DOE 1 and DOE 4, which was owned, operated, controlled and run by Defendant DOE 1 and Defendant DOE 4. Plaintiff and Plaintiff's family came in contact with PERPETRATOR as an agent and representative of Defendants, and at DOE 1 and DOE 4.
- 27. Plaintiff participated in youth activities and church activities at DOE 4. Plaintiff was educated and taught the theology and tenets of the Roman Catholic Church on matters of faith, morals and religious doctrine. Plaintiff therefore developed great admiration, trust, reverence, respect for, and obedience to the Roman Catholic Church and clergy who occupied positions of great influence and persuasion as holy men and authority figures. Plaintiff was encouraged to trust, respect, and obey PERPETRATOR by and through Defendants.
- 28. As a minor, Plaintiff regularly attended mass and engaged in confession with priests employed by Defendant DOE 1, Accordingly, a special relationship was formed between Plaintiff, then a minor, and Defendants. As delineated in <u>California Evidence Code</u> sections 1030-1034, codifying the clergymen-penitent privilege, the fact that a special relationship between Defendants and parishioners not only exists, but extents to non-spiritual matters.
- 29. During and through these activities, Plaintiff, as a minor and vulnerable child, was dependent on Defendants and their agents, including PERPETRATOR. Plaintiff was under the custody and control of Defendants, who had control over Plaintiff's welfare and who were responsible for running the DOE 4 with a duty to protect Plaintiff because he was in a special relationship with Defendants. Defendants had accepted the entrustment of Plaintiff and had responsibility for Plaintiff and authority over Plaintiff.
- 30. In approximately 1967, when Plaintiff was approximately thirteen years old and member of Defendant DOE 1 and Defendant DOE 4, PERPETRATOR sexually assaulted Plaintiff, a minor. While performing his duties as a religious brother, and for the purpose of furthering the

duties required in that role, PERPETRATOR befriended Plaintiff and gained Plaintiff's trust and confidence as a spiritual guide, authority figure, and trustworthy mentor.

- 31. Seeing PERPETRATOR as a trustworthy mentor, Plaintiff was conditioned to comply with PERPETRATOR's direction and to respect him as a person of authority in spiritual, ethical, and educational matters. PERPETRATOR's conduct constituted "grooming" of Plaintiff and culminated in his childhood sexual assault and abuse of Plaintiff.
- 32. PERPETRATOR utilized Defendants' facilities and institutions to gain access to Plaintiff. At all relevant times, PERPETRATOR was referred to as "Brother" and wore the religous collar and attire. This signified to people that PERPETRATOR was in good standing and authorized by Defendants to act as a priest and agent of the Church. It was by virtue of PERPETRATOR's position as a priest of Defendants that he met and groomed Plaintiff, established trust with Plaintiff, and manipulated that trust in order to sexually assault and abuse Plaintiff.
- 33. PERPETRATOR sexually assaulted Plaintiff on the premises owned, operated, and controlled by Defendants DOE 1 and Defendant DOE 2, including in the school at DOE 4. PERPETRATOR's sexual abuse of Plaintiff included, but was not limited to: sexual touching. PERPETRATOR's sexual abuse of Plaintiff began when Plaintiff was approximately thirteen years old.
- 34. PERPETRATOR sexually abused Plaintiff for sexual gratification and was, at least in part, based on the Plaintiff's gender and age, who was a minor child at the time.
- 35. This childhood sexual abuse constitutes "childhood sexual assault" pursuant to <u>Code</u> of <u>Civil Procedure</u> section 340.1(d) as amended by Assembly Bill 218, including any act committed against Plaintiff that occurred when the Plaintiff was under the age of 18 years and that would have been proscribed by Section 266j of the <u>Penal Code</u>; Section 285 of the <u>Penal Code</u>; paragraph (1) or (2) of subdivision (b), or of subdivision (c), of Section 286 of the <u>Penal Code</u>; subdivision (a) or (b) of Section 288 of the <u>Penal Code</u>; paragraph (1) or (2) of subdivision (b), or of subdivision (c), of Section 287 or of former Section 288a of the <u>Penal Code</u>; subdivision (h), (i), or (j) of Section 289 of the <u>Penal Code</u>; any sexual conduct as defined in paragraph (1) of subdivision (d) of Section 311.4 of the Penal Code; Section 647.6 of the Penal Code; and/or any prior laws of this state of

similar effect at the time the act was committed.

- 36. Plaintiff did not, and was unable to give free or voluntary consent to the sexual acts perpetrated against Plaintiff by PERPETRATOR, as Plaintiff was a minor child at the time of the abuse alleged herein.
- 37. By using his position within Defendants' institutions, Defendant DOE 1, Defendant DOE 2, DOE Defendants and PERPETRATOR, demanded and required that Plaintiff respect PERPETRATOR in his position as a priest, teacher, spiritual advisor, confidant, counselor and mentor for Defendants.
- 38. As a direct and proximate result of PERPETRATOR's childhood sexual assault against Plaintiff, which was enabled and facilitated by Defendants, and each of them, Plaintiff has suffered and will continue to suffer physical, psychological, emotional and economic harm in a sum to be proven at the time of trial.
- 39. As a direct and proximate result of Plaintiff's sexual abuse by PERPETRATOR, which was enabled and facilitated by Defendants, and each of them, Plaintiff has suffered economic injury, all to Plaintiff's general, special and consequential damage in an amount to be proven at trial, but in no event less than the minimum jurisdictional amount of this Court.
- 40. PERPETRATOR at all times material hereto was an employee, agent and/or representative of Defendants. PERPETRATOR engaged in unlawful sexual conduct with Plaintiff when Plaintiff was a minor. Defendants are vicariously liable for the childhood sexual abuse committed by PERPETRATOR, including but not limited to through the theories of respondent superior, ratification, and authorization. PERPETRATOR's childhood sexual misconduct with Plaintiff occurred while he was functioning on behalf of Defendants, and was made possible because of that agency.
- 41. Under Church protocol and practice, in return for the vow of obedience by a priest, the Bishop accepts responsibility for the care and welfare of a priest as well as to supervise the priest's ministry. A diocesan priest may not engage in any form of public ministry without the permission of his Bishop. By allowing a priest to engage in public ministry, such as by allowing him to wear his religious/priestly attire and hold himself out as a priest, the Bishop is certifying that

the priest is in good standing and sexually safe.

- 42. The Defendants ratified and authorized PERPETRATOR's childhood sexual abuse of Plaintiff by (1) failing to discharge, dismiss, discipline, suspend and/or supervise PERPETRATOR or other priests known by Defendants to have sexually abused children, or to have been accused of sexually abusing children, (2) actively shielding PERPETRATOR from responsibility for his childhood sexual assault of Plaintiff and other minors, (3) failing to acknowledge the existence of complaints against PERPETRATOR of childhood sexual assault on Plaintiff and minors, (4) failing to report such complaints to civil or criminal authorities, (5) providing financial support to PERPETRATOR during and/or after the childhood sexual abuse of Plaintiff and/or other minors, and (6) failing to take steps to timely remove PERPETRATOR from the priesthood so as to permanently prevent him from using his authority bestowed upon him by Defendants to gain access to minors and sexually abuse them.
- 43. By taking the above wrongful, negligent, and/or intentional actions and/or failing to act after having knowledge or having reason to know of such childhood sexual abuse of Plaintiff and/or other minors, Defendants ratified and authorized PERPETRATOR's sexual abuse of minors. By ratifying PERPETRATOR's sexual abuse of minors, Defendants in legal effect committed and caused the childhood sexual abuse of Plaintiff when Plaintiff was a minor.
- 44. Defendants failed to uphold numerous mandatory duties imposed upon them by state and federal law, and by written policies and procedures applicable to Defendants.
- 45. As a minor at DOE 4, which was owned, operated, and controlled by the Defendants, and where PERPETRATOR was employed, retained, and worked, Plaintiff was under Defendants' direct supervision, care, and control. This constituted a special relationship, fiduciary relationship and/or special care relationship between Plaintiff and Defendants. Additionally, as a minor child under the custody, care, and control of Defendants, Defendants stood *in loco parentis* with respect to Plaintiff while Plaintiff was at DOE 4. As the responsible parties and/or employers controlling PERPETRATOR, the Defendants were also in a special relationship with Plaintiff, and owed special duties to Plaintiff.
 - 46. Defendants knew or had reason to know, or were otherwise on notice, that

minors in the past, and/or was continuing to engage in such conduct with Plaintiff, and failed to take reasonable steps, and to implement reasonable safeguards, to avoid acts of unlawful sexual conduct in the future by PERPETRATOR.

47. Defendants had a duty to disclose these facts to Plaintiff, Plaintiff's parents and

PERPETRATOR had engaged in misconduct, engaged in unlawful sexual-related conduct with

- 47. Defendants had a duty to disclose these facts to Plaintiff, Plaintiff's parents and others, but negligently and/or intentionally suppressed, concealed, or failed to disclose this information for the express purposes of maintaining PERPETRATOR's image as an ethical, wholesome, safe, and trusted spiritual leader at and within the institution run by the Defendants. The duty to disclose this information arose from the special, trusting, confidential, fiduciary, and *in loco parentis* relationship between Defendants and Plaintiff.
- 48. Instead, Defendants ignored and/or concealed the childhood sexual abuse of Plaintiff and others by PERPETRATOR and continued to allow numerous children, including the Plaintiff, to be in private, secluded areas with PERPETRATOR, despite knowledge of or reasons to suspect PERPETRATOR's prior sexually abusive acts toward minors.
- 49. Plaintiff is informed, believes and thereon alleges that Defendants were given notice of inappropriate misconduct conduct committed by PERPETRATOR.
- 50. Defendants failed to report and hid and concealed from Plaintiff's parents, other minor children in their care and their parents, law enforcement authorities, civil authorities, and others, the true facts and relevant information necessary to bring PERPETRATOR to justice for the sexual misconduct he committed with minors and to protect those entrusted in their care, including Plaintiff.
- Defendants had the authority and ability to stop PERPETRATOR's childhood sexual abuse of Plaintiff, but negligently and/or willfully failed to do so, thereby allowing the abuse to occur and continue unabated. This failure was part of Defendants' plan and arrangement to conceal wrongful acts, to avoid or interfere with detections, to block public disclosure, to avoid scandal, to avoid disclosure of their tolerance of childhood sexual abuse, to preserve a false appearance of propriety, and to avoid investigation and action by public authority, including law enforcement.

52. At the time of PERPETRATOR's childhood sexual assault of Plaintiff, as defined by Code of Civil Procedure section 340.1(d), Defendants knew or had reason to know, or were otherwise on notice of prior acts of childhood sexual abuse committed by PERPETRATOR, and despite such knowledge and/or notice, failed to take reasonable steps or implement reasonable safeguards to protect Plaintiff from childhood sexual abuse. These acts and/or omissions on the part of Defendants were committed in spite of their ability to exercise control over the personal and business affairs of PERPETRATOR. Accordingly, Defendants are liable for PERPETRATOR's childhood sexual abuse of Plaintiff in that their wrongful, intentional and/or negligent acts were a legal cause of Plaintiff's abuse.

NEGLIGENCE (As to ALL Defendants)

- 53. Plaintiff repeats, re-alleges and incorporates herein by reference all consistent paragraphs of this Complaint as if fully set forth herein.
- 54. Defendants' conduct, actions, and omissions served to create an environment in which PERPETRATOR was afforded years of continuous secluded access to minor children, including Plaintiff, who was approximately thirteen years of age at the time Plaintiff was sexually assaulted by PERPETRATOR.
- 55. At the time PERPETRATOR performed the acts alleged herein it was or should have been reasonably foreseeable to Defendants that by continuously exposing and making Plaintiff available to PERPETRATOR, Defendants were placing Plaintiff at grave risk of being sexually abused by PERPETRATOR. By knowingly subjecting Plaintiff to this foreseeable danger, Defendants were duty-bound to take reasonable steps and implement reasonable safeguards to protect Plaintiff from PERPETRATOR. Further, at all times alleged herein, Defendants possessed a sufficient degree of control over PERPETRATOR's personal and business affairs so as to keep PERPETRATOR away from Plaintiff and other minor children, and prevent any childhood sexual abuse against them. Defendants, however, failed to take reasonable steps or implement reasonable safeguards for Plaintiff's protection.

56. As a direct and proximate result of Defendants' acts and omissions Plaintiff has suffered and will continue to suffer physical, psychological, emotional and economic harm in a sum to be proven at the time of trial.

NEGLIGENT SUPERVISION OF PERPETRATOR

- 57. Defendants owed Plaintiff a duty to provide reasonable supervision over PERPETRATOR, to use reasonable care in investigating PERPETRATOR's background, and to provide adequate warning to the Plaintiff, and others, of PERPETRATOR's dangerous propensities.
- 58. Defendants, by and through their respective agents, servants and employees, knew or had reason to know of PERPETRATOR's dangerous and exploitive propensities. Despite such knowledge, Defendants negligently failed to supervise PERPETRATOR, a supervisor of minor children with the propensity and ability to commit wrongful acts against Plaintiff. Defendants failed to provide reasonable supervisions of PERPETRATOR, failed to use reasonable care in investigating PERPETRATOR, and failed to provide adequate warning to Plaintiff and others of PERPETRATOR's dangerous propensities and unfitness. Defendants further failed to take reasonable measures to prevent the childhood sexual abuse, molestation and harassment of minor children, including Plaintiff.
- 59. As an institution entrusted with the care of minors, where staff, employees, agents, and management, such as PERPETRATOR, were placed in contact with minor children, the Defendants expressly and implicitly represented that these individuals, including PERPETRATOR, were not a threat to children and others who would fall under PERPETRATOR's influence, control, direction, and guidance.
- 60. Defendants were aware or had reason to have been aware of how vulnerable children were to sexual harassment, molestation and abuse by mentors, advisors, teachers, counselor and other persons of authority within the Defendants.
- 61. Defendants breached their duty to Plaintiff by, *inter alia*, failing to adequately monitor and supervise PERPETRATOR and failing to stop PERPETRATOR from committing wrongful sexual acts with minors, including Plaintiff. Plaintiff is informed and believes that

employees, staff and agents of Defendants knew and/or suspected the abuse was occurring at the time and failed to investigate the matter further.

62. As a direct and proximate result of Defendants' acts and omissions Plaintiff has suffered and will continue to suffer physical, psychological, emotional and economic harm in a sum to be proven at the time of trial.

NEGLIGENT RETENTION OF PERPETRATOR

- 63. Defendants owed Plaintiff a duty not to retain PERPETRATOR given his pedophile propensities, which Defendants knew or had reason to know had they engaged in a meaningful and adequate investigation of his background.
- 64. As institutions entrusted with the care of minors, where staff, employees, agents and management, such as PERPETRATOR were placed in contact with minors, Defendants expressly and implicitly represented that these individuals, including PERPETRATOR, were not a sexual threat to children and others who would fall under PERPETRATOR's influence, control, direction and guidance.
- 65. Defendants knew or had reason to know, suspected or otherwise been on notice of PERPETRATOR's misconduct.
- 66. As a direct and proximate result of Defendants' acts and omissions Plaintiff has suffered and will continue to suffer physical, psychological, emotional and economic harm in a sum to be proven at the time of trial.

SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION NEGLIGENCE (As to ALL Defendants)

NEGLIGENT SUPERVISION OF PLAINTIFF, THEN A MINOR

- 67. Plaintiff repeats, re-alleges and incorporates herein by reference all consistent paragraphs of this Complaint as if fully set forth herein.
- 68. Plaintiff's Second Cause of action is an alternative additional theory of liability as alleged as against Defendants.
 - 69. Defendants are liable for the acts and omissions of their employees and agents,

including PERPETRATOR, acting within the course and scope of their employment and/or agency. At all times herein, Defendants employees, including PERPETRATOR, were acting within the course and scope of their employment.

- 70. Defendants had a duty to provide supervision of Plaintiff, a minor, and to use reasonable care in supervising Plaintiff, a minor, when Plaintiff was involved in activities sponsored, supervised, organized, directed, and/or operated by Defendants or their agents and employees.
 - 71. Defendants breached their duty of care.
- 72. Defendants negligently failed to properly and/or adequately supervise Plaintiff, a minor, and failed to use reasonable care in protecting Plaintiff, a minor, from PERPETRATOR's misconduct that created a risk of childhood sexual assault while Plaintiff, a minor, was involved in activities sponsored, supervised, organized, directed, and/or operated by Defendants and their agents and/or employees.
- 73. Defendants breach was a substantial factor in PERPETRATOR's childhood sexual assault of Plaintiff.
- 74. As a direct, legal, and proximate cause of Defendants acts, omissions and/or negligence, PERPETRATOR committed acts of childhood sexual assault against Plaintiff.
- 75. As a direct and proximate result of Defendants' acts and omissions Plaintiff has suffered and will continue to suffer physical, psychological, emotional and economic harm in a sum to be proven at the time of trial.

PRAYER FOR RELIEF

WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays for the following relief against Defendants:

- 1. For damages for past and future medical, psychotherapy, and related expenses according to proof at the time of trial;
- 2. For general damages for physical and mental pain and suffering and emotional distress in a sum to be proven at the time of trial;
- 3. For damages for past loss wages and past earning capacity and/or future lost wages and loss of earning capacity according to proof at the time of trial;

1	4.	For treble damages agains	st Defendant DOE 1, a Religious Corporation sole,
2	Defendant DOE 2, a Religious Corporation sole, Defendant DOE 3, a Religious Order, Defendan		
3	DOE 4, a Religious School, and Defendants DOE 5 through DOE 100, as authorized by section		
4	340.1 of the Code of Civil Procedure;		
5	5.	For interest as allowed by	law;
6	6.	For costs of suit herein; a	nd
7	7.	For such other and further	r relief as the Court deems proper.
8	DATED: De	ecember 31, 2019	JEFF ANDERSON & ASSOCIATES
9			21.01
10			MICHAEL RECK
11			MICHAEL G. FINNEGAN JOSEPH GEORGE, JR.
12			JENNIFER E. STEIN Attorneys for Plaintiff JOHN DOE SJ 1007
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DEMAND FOR TRIAL

Plaintiff hereby demands a trial by jury in this matter.

DATED: December 31, 2019

JEFF ANDERSON & ASSOCIATES

MICHAEL RECK

MICHAEL G. FINNEGAN JOSEPH GEORGE, JR.

JENNIFER E. STEÍN

Attorneys for Plaintiff JOHN DOE SJ 1007